

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10046

13 October 1981

# West Europe Report

(FOUO 52/81)



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [ ] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF  
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION  
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

JPRS L/10046

13 October 1981

## WEST EUROPE REPORT

(FOUO 52/81)

### CONTENTS

#### ENERGY ECONOMICS

##### BELGIUM

- Government Criticized on Coal Subsidies, Mine Closings  
(Jean Guily; POURQUOI PAS?, 3 Sep 81) ..... 1

#### ECONOMIC

##### FRANCE

- Unions' Role, Demands Under Socialist Government  
(Jean Dubois; PROJET, Sep-Oct 81) ..... 3

#### POLITICAL

##### FRANCE

- Citizens Desire Right-Wing Activity; Chirac, Giscard Plan  
(Irene Allier; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12 Sep 81) ..... 12
- CGT Leadership Change: Seguy's Health or PCF Stalinists  
(Claude-Francois Jullien; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 12 Sep 81).. 17
- New Government: Transition, Errors, Successes, Future Problems  
(Hugues Portelli; PROJET, Sep-Oct 81) ..... 20
- PS-PC Conflicts: Nuclear, Military, Immigrants  
(Arthur Conte; PARIS MATCH, 28 Aug 81) ..... 23

##### ITALY

- PCI'S Colajanni Interviewed on Intraparty Wrangles  
(Napoleone Colajanni Interview; EUROPEO, 21 Sep 81) ..... 28

- a -

[III - WE - 150 FOUO]

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ENERGY ECONOMICS

BELGIUM

GOVERNMENT CRITICIZED ON COAL SUBSIDIES, MINE CLOSINGS

Brussels POURQUOI PAS? in French 3 Sep 81 pp 13-15

[Article by Jean Guilly: "Coal, Coal, Coal!"]

[Text] Willy Claes is ready to grant a 1 year reprieve to the last Walloon coal mine, the Roton in Farciennes, near Charleroi, which would thus close its gates on 31 October 1982. The minister is really too generous. But could we ask the minister about the fate he has planned for the coal mines of Eisden and Winterslag, which cost the Belgian taxpayers just as much?

As a matter of fact, our Willy has already answered the question. In a recent memorandum submitted to his colleagues, the minister of economic affairs justified both coal and the coal mines of the Campine, which he sees as one and to which he generously attributes the same future. This, very obviously, a little short. We are quite willing to admit, if necessary, the importance, even a relative one, of a mini-independence in terms of energy. We should no longer ignore possibilities offered by new technologies, in which -- consider the underground gasification -- our country is getting behind. Finally, it is also important to avoid social tragedies -- 20,000 miners to find a new job for, which is utopian -- which would result from the widespread closings which nobody, furthermore, seems to want. Should we for all that continue to pay the full price, and blindly so, for an artificial survival of the Belgian coal mines? This is what Willy Claes, bothered by his voters, would like.

This would not seem wise. In addition, such a policy is not within our means. And the "little red man," who regularly promises us the apocalypse for tomorrow, is not the last one to know it...

156 Billion - 10 Years

In this case, the opinion issued by the Walloon executive in July 1979 appears to us to carry certain nuances: "In the prevailing uncertainty concerning supply," they wrote, "the contribution made by the coal production in Limburg constitutes a measure of security, even if the cost of producing coal in Limburg is much higher than that of coal imported at the world price or even than the average production cost within the Common Market. However, the executive requests that the exact cost of this measure of security be calculated both in relation to the annual tonnage to be mined and the duration of the exploitation." Two years later, we are still navigating by guesswork and the services of the Ministry of Economic Affairs do not

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

seem to be prepared to lift the fog. Well, a moment of embarrassment is quickly over...

According to Jean-Maurice Dehousse and his fellow workers, an estimate of the expenses the state will have to support for loan guarantees for the National Company for the Financing of Coal Mines between 1982 and 1991 may be estimated at 156.3 billion francs. It is not certain. This will undoubtedly require a few explanations, if not an adjustment of the aim.

The first thing would be to define the coal policy in Belgium within the framework of a real energy policy. Why not then, in this context, call with the utmost urgency for a parliamentary debate on energy which is continuously being postponed indefinitely? For administrators worthy of that name, however, it would be an opportunity to set in motion a new industrial policy with concrete and immediate fall-out on employment: Mark Eyskens prefers to criticize the Belgians for living it up too much. Of course, it is much easier to bawl us out!

On the other hand, one can only agree with the Walloon executive when it states that, in order to prevent the "exponential" growth of the amounts to be paid by the state for the coal mines from reaching unbearable levels, it would be advisable as of now to consider a ceiling on financial intervention. The possible heirs of the gravediggers who are currently in power, are preparing themselves for a dreadful succession: in 1991, the cost of the Limburg coal will be, at best, on the order of 30 billion francs. For budgetary reasons, it will no longer be a question, under those conditions, of raising the school standards but of eliminating schools! One cannot stop progress...

The Roton and Others

The losses soaked up by the providential state will continue to climb: from 1,864 francs per ton for all the coal mines in the Campine for the year 1980, they will reach 2,500 francs 4 years from now, and 4,300 francs in 1990. As these figures came from Mr Claes, we would not want to suspect him of having placed the line too high...

To give an example, for the first 4 months of 1981, the losses per ton at Eisden were already at 2,120 francs, and at Winterslag at 3,211 francs. The Roton, with its 2,398 francs, did not, by the way, have anything to blush about.

Hence, there is cause -- as it occurred and will occur in the steel industry -- to rationalize. The fact that this rationalization applies solely to the Roton, the reserves of which were estimated at 1,230,000 tons as of 31 October 1981 by the Service of Mine Management in Charleroi, and the closing of which could logically take place in 1985, is disturbing to say the least. One-way savings are accepted with increasing ill will in Wallonia where, if necessary, they might understand and accept that the state turn off the faucet for the Roton as long as a similar effort, equally justified, is requested of Limburg. Which is not the case.

The coal file has been "put into commission." For the miners of Farciennes, the wait continues. To settle their fate without taking into account the Belgian context would be an injustice. One more. It would also be an economic mistake. One more also...

COPYRIGHT: 1981 POURQUOI PAS?

8463  
CSO: 3100/963

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

ECONOMIC

FRANCE

UNIONS' ROLE, DEMANDS UNDER SOCIALIST GOVERNMENT

Paris PROJET in French Sep-Oct 81 pp 940-948

[Article by Jean Dubois: "The New Social Deal"]

[Text] In the latest statements from the employers and the labor unions, J. Dubois detects relatively parallel analyses which can lead to compatible strategies. The labor unions and the employers are facing common problems and it is in their interest to solve them together. Negotiations on both sides look like the only way out of the current dead-lock.

"A new social deal," it was announced just about everywhere. The thing seemed certain if one listened to the apocalyptic remarks from some employer circles: "Just read the socialist draft, look at all the powers given to the labor unions; business and industry will be paralyzed." The same impression came from wage earners, that is, "to cut down" some militants who allowed themselves to dream: "no more arbitrary actions by the employers; the time has come to move on to self-management." A new deal--are you sure? Leaving each to his own imagination, let us address ourselves to the central question: "Is there a chance that the change in the political majority might introduce a radical transformation in relations between the employers and the labor unions?" The answer is not obvious. This might be a simple episode in the endless struggle which, for a century, has been going on between the employers and the labor unions. But it is also possible that an irreversible turning point might be reached, that the labor unions might assume a new face for themselves and that the style of industrial relations in France might be turned upside down.

The Hundred Years' War Continues

One word comes to mind in describing French-style industrial relations, in comparison to other countries, and that word is archaism; these relations essentially continue to be a part of the patterns inherited from the 19th century. A revolutionary labor unionism, an agent in the class struggle, establishes for itself the objective of abolishing the employers. Quite logically in keeping with the adage of "to kill or be killed," the employers dream of the death of their adversary. Even though the most radical solutions a long time ago lost their likelihood of materializing, the attitudes did survive: Open warfare is followed by guerilla war. Throughout these past several years, the deliberate policy of

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

a number of employers was aimed at pushing the labor unions to the sidelines as much as possible, in the absence of success in eliminating the labor unions altogether. The labor unions, on the other hand, adopted ways of behavior that amounted to counteraggression and rejected anything that smacked of "class collaboration."

A third partner--the government--always held a capital position in this social war. To win, each of the protagonists needed to have an ally. The more the powers of the state grew, the more did the conquest of political power become an essential stake. The two-way game had become a three-way game and developed according to an unalterable scenario whose end does not seem to be coming. As if they were obeying the movement of an invisible scale, the adversaries alternately experienced success and defeat. Let us recall the latest episodes which are not too far back. In 1936, the labor unions advanced along the broad Popular Front; this advance was wiped out by the events of 1940 and the Vichy regime. In 1945, the labor unions resumed the offensive but the gains of the Liberation would be eroded as the Left-wing parties lost all access to power. The year 1968 brought back a certain dash to the labor union movement but the economic crisis quickly put it on the defensive while the employers congratulated each other on having a government to their liking.

Within this perspective, what does May 1981 mean? A simple return swing of the scale; it now remains for us to wait for the next phase and the medium-term scenario for the future will be written without any big chance of mistake.

The labor unions will benefit from their position of strength to get as many advantages as possible, both regarding their conventional demands (wages, job security) and in terms of institutional power (labor union rights, powers of the enterprise committee). On the strength of their closeness to the political establishment, they will be persuaded to prefer the way of the broadest possible legislative measures.

The enterprise managers, in falling back on arguments of an economic nature, would try to cut their losses and will bow to the inevitable; but they will wait for a real economic crisis to give them back their position of strength which they held during the preceding phase.

In short, only the balance of forces will have been reversed for a moment. Nothing else will really have changed in the nature of industrial relations. The Hundred Years' War will continue and 1981 will just have been one of its episodes.

This scenario is the scenario of failure. Not only political failure in more or less long-range terms but above all a fundamental failure for the labor unions. It is not by accident that there has been talk of deunionizing for several years now; this is not a temporary or passing phenomenon. Some recent public opinion surveys confirm the diagnosis: Wage earners are profoundly tied to the fact of the existence of labor unions but they want a different kind of unionism. The passage of some social laws or an increase in labor union rights will not in any way constitute a response to this demand. In the absence of finding it, the prediction of deunionization will undoubtedly in the end become a reality. And that will mean failure.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Sociological Lesson from May 1981

This scenario appeared to be the most likely so long as one looks at it through the spectacles of the past. On the other hand, a different reading of events is possible if one adopts a broader sociological perspective. Our society is changing and what happened in May 1981 evidences the emergence of strong tendencies which have been at work for a long time already. Henceforth, the victory of the Left is no longer a part of the cycle of eternal return but signals a possible advance toward the establishment of new industrial relations in a different society.

A Differentiated Society

There is a first strong tendency which creates almost unanimity among sociologists: We are moving toward a more differentiated society; one can no longer describe it in terms of the simplistic categories of yesterday. There is no longer any bloc of rich people facing the masses of poor people, with the working class facing the bourgeoisie. The demands remained homogeneous so long as the wage earners lived in poverty and insecurity; with the rise in the living standard, differentiated needs emerged. The qualitative themes became intermingled with the quantitative themes. Subgroups took shape and they no longer resembled the excessively vague definitions of the working class. Each of them has its own aspirations which sometimes clash with those of the other subgroups. Some of them want to be able to work more and others demand more free time; the immigrants demand that we make room for them while our native-born citizens defend their job monopoly; young and old, men and women are becoming involved in competition. And let us not speak of the objective diversity of status or economic situations; what is there in common among those wage earners whose job is almost guaranteed and the seasonal workers whose number keeps multiplying? What is there in common between those workers in the small enterprises of the declining branches and those technicians in the big industrial groups that are at the very spearhead of technological progress, etc.?

For the past 2 years, conflicts have each time been regrouping different subcategories; sometimes wage earners in one and the same enterprise (including supervisory personnel), sometimes a single job category, and other times even a single workshop or a single establishment in one and the same company, sometimes an entire city or region, etc. There is no longer any constant in all this.

As a more profound and new development, we can now see the workers today looking forward to the possibility of pursuing individualized strategies of preference over collective strategies. They reject the vocation of institutions to determine the best strategy in their place, in other words, control them. The document on "The Future of Labor"—drawn up in preparation for the eighth plan—summarizes this tendency: "The new thing is that each thinks that it is up to him to judge what has to be done in relation to his desires. Perhaps this is the emergence of a new morality among the workers: Individual protest is considered possible without excessive costs"<sup>1</sup>.

The multiplication of information and the complexity of modern systems offer real possibilities for looking forward to a broad diversity of strategies; there is no longer a single road toward obtaining one's salvation. According to Mr Crozier, "Actors who have a multiplicity of alternatives available to them can no longer be controlled, guided, and forced to act in the same fashion as they did in a system in which they had a considerably lesser degree of liberty"<sup>2</sup>.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

From that moment on we can just guess what the menace is which hovers over these institutions, both the enterprise and the union; they can no longer be content with their traditional ways of regulation which have become too simplistic. It is their authority which is now being challenged: "In all human gatherings at this time, in which the multiplicity of interactions offers choices unknown until now, the forms of authority which constituted the foundation of the institution are breaking up. One can no longer in the same fashion control people who henceforth enjoy degrees of liberty which transform the very nature of the social fabric. The believer can seek refuge with his pastor, just as the draftee can run to his officers and the high school student to his teachers"<sup>3</sup> and by the same token the worker can run to his outfit, the labor unionist can run to his delegates.

This context enables us to interpret May 1981. The victory of the Left is not due to the sudden support of the French for the old revolutionary programs, suddenly perceived as a miracle remedy for all ills, certainly not as a "big thing," promising an idyllic society. On the contrary, the election success did not stop the skepticism of many people. Each doubts that the economic difficulties will disappear all at once, that unemployment and the operating restrictions of the enterprises will vanish. As a matter of fact, the Socialist Party's success is the success of a "catch-all" party; instead of giving this expression a pejorative meaning, we should perceive its profound truth: The PS [Socialist Party] won because it appeared to be the only one to achieve the rally of widely differentiated groups which neither in the Giscardian nor in the prospects of the collectivist type, found the way of being heard and represented. In this sense, the success of the Left is due less to the content of its program and it is due more to the prospects of differentiated actions which it presents.

Will this orientation become a fact? The role of the labor unions will be a central one here. Or, succumbing to its old demons, continuing to fight yesterday's war, it will line up its demand action toward the procurement of overall measures, thus hoping to meet the aspirations of a majority of its followers; that would mean preparing the disillusionment of tomorrow; in shutting itself off within the area of overall measures, it will fail to respond to the aspirations for autonomy and difference which are behind the current social movements. Or it will understand that it is the only one capable of conducting differentiated actions, adapted to the diversity of work situations, modulated according to the particular features of each enterprise, each worker category. By losing speed while sticking to overall programs which are excessively politicized, it can start a rejuvenation cure by demonstrating its local effectiveness in changing the daily lives of the wage earners. Its future position therefore from this moment on, will not be to work toward a problematical ideological adhesion to a program but toward the verifiable utility of the labor union institution in modifying the living and working conditions of each and every one. That is the chance which is offered to it today.

## Labor Unionism Recognized at Last

If labor unionism remained on the general and political level for so long, allowing the gap between the wage-earner rank and file and the apparatuses to grow, it at least had a good excuse: The feeling of not being really recognized. Above all it had to fight to exist.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Everything so far happened as if France had escaped the second major strong tendency which emerged in the other industrial nations: The tendency toward integration and institutionalization of labor unionism. Just about everywhere, the political system has permitted the opposition to be integrated in society, to have access to the Establishment when its turn came, without talking of revolution, without being subjected of threatening the country's general interest. Likewise, labor unionism very early was recognized as an integral part of the social system. It was allowed to increase that which the sociologists call "access to control," that is to say, the ability to have its say in the decisions of other institutions such as the government, the enterprise. Very equitable "rules of the game" were established so that the labor unions might agree to play the game instead of spending their time trying to change the rules.

That is not the case in France. The laws are not being challenged but the attitude, deep down, of the ruling class is being challenged. Jacques Moreau summarized the strategy of the employers as follows: "As a matter of fact, the present approach of enterprise managers tends to modernize the old dream of the French employers. For most of them, labor unionism is still an evil which one puts up with but which should be rooted out as soon as possible. Is this an excessive judgment? The expression is never as direct as all that but this is where the tendency of recommended policies is oriented in the end. In the absence of being able to challenge its recognition once again, they will try to limit their control and to reject their action outside the enterprise or in the institutions which are formalized and devoid of content"<sup>4</sup>.

This gap with respect to the general tendency toward integration is so spectacular that one of the first actions taken by President Giscard was to try to fill the gap by creating a condition for the "reform of powers in the enterprise." We know what happened to the Sudreau report which recommended the "strengthening of the means of labor union action" and "the extension of the field of negotiations"; only a few scraps are left. The power of the enterprise boss remained a taboo area and labor unionism once again was pushed to the sidelines.

From this viewpoint, May 1981 has a very obvious meaning: It is a big step on the road toward social integration. The political system shows, for the first time, its capacity to implement alternation in office according to normal channels. The most revolutionary elements were disqualified. The electorate voted for those who wanted to make changes in society and not those who wanted to change society. Labor unionism found itself getting a place of honor on the national level; some of its members took over important functions in the presidential and ministerial offices. The appointment of communist ministers runs along those lines; until now considered pestilential, the minority finds itself a part of the collective setup.

This process of integration will be continued if certain measures are taken concerning labor union rights. The latter constitute a big bugaboo for quite a few employers. Still, this involves practices, several of which were already contained in the Sudreau report, while others are already in use in Germany or Sweden. Much less than a rupture, this involves the line up of France along a tendency that is more advanced elsewhere. We have fallen behind; but we are now in the process of catching up.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Is this scenario too optimistic? Undoubtedly, to the extent that its realization depends on two prior prerequisites.

First of all, the employers must accept the fact of institutionalization; they must get used to the idea of facing a strong partner; they must learn to exercise their own power by taking into account another power that is capable of limiting their power. Employer responsibility is overwhelming here. If the employers prove incapable of playing this new game, they will be forcing the labor unions to fall back on the state, to demand of it that it impose restrictive laws which the employer partner always rejected. This will then give us a system of formal rules and procedures involving paralyzing controls.

On the other hand, the labor unions must know how to use their new power. They may be tempted to abuse their victory; they might think that they have won the battle once and for all; they may in turn ignore the employer as a partner; they may wish to impose the strongest possible law upon the employer. Intoxicated with their access to political power, the labor unions might take the apparently easy way by settling everything through the law, multiplying statutory guarantees. In this way the labor unions would be expressing their disdain for the enterprise and by the same token they would, among the employers, trigger forms of behavior amounting to the "resistance" to labor unionism which would lead back to the scenario of The Hundred Year's War.

There is nothing obviously to assure us that these two conditions will be met. On the other hand, we have never had a similar opportunity to break out of the vicious cycle where the employers and labor unions were trapped. It would be astonishing if nobody were to try to benefit from that.

A Chance to be Grasped

The blinders of the past very often prevent us from detecting signs of renewal no matter how obvious they may be. That is the impression which we get today from the comparative reading of statements from the employers and from the labor unions. Behind the reciprocal denunciations, we think we can detect the appearance of relatively parallel analyses which are liable to lead to compatible strategies; the concepts of labor unionism are getting closer rather than moving further apart; labor unions and employers face common problems which it is in their interest to solve together; a relationship based on the development of negotiations appears on either side as the only way out of the current deadlock.

Parallel Analyses

French employers often expressed their dream of finding a labor union partner less under the control of political slogans and more concerned with enterprise problems rather than with overall ideological viewpoints. Very recently, F. Ceyrac declared: "The labor unions today are moving along the line of 1936. They seem to be prisoners of a linear tradition which is now 44 years old, which absolutely ignores both the aspirations of men and women for work and the needs of the enterprise. The aspirations of men are not the same at Dunkerque and Perpignan in a plant where there are many women, in a plant out in the countryside, in a plant at Gennevilliers or Lyons; I therefore think that progress is moving toward diversification, that is to say, the search--on the enterprise level--for solutions adapted to the real operating conditions of the enterprise and of labor"<sup>5</sup>.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

E. Maire finds words just as harsh in denouncing those who only believe in overall solutions: "They confine labor union action to a few unifying demands, incapable of responding to the extraordinary complexity of real life. They put all their hopes in a political victory which is considered to be able to resolve, from top-side, the problems which they leave untouched today. The only supportable labor unionist attitude consists in definitely rejecting this new promise of bureaucracy and setting up the facts, the requirements, and the real aspirations of each social group as the first basis for action and reflection"<sup>6</sup>.

Without pursuing these parallel quotations, let us be content here with one last approach: Mr Ceyrac defined the social policy of the employers as having to develop toward "personalization." Here is what he says: "The rise in the living standard creates a wide diversity of aspirations and thus, to respond to that, an individualization of solutions. The principle of individualized social policies is the fruit of a convergence between the aspirations of the personnel and the necessities of the enterprise." And E. Maire somehow came up with an echo to that: "Building labor union action as close as possible to each worker, rehabilitating an attitude of inquiry, a thirst for knowledge, unstanding the why's of individual and collective reactions...there is no other way to make up our long-standing delay and to build the labor unionism of our time."

But, some people might say, what about the CGT [General Confederation of Labor]? One must undoubtedly bet that it will be forced to follow the movement started by the other labor unions. Such a bet is not impossible when one reads the declarations of J. L. Moynot; he also thinks that the essential part of the game will be played in the enterprise: "The change cannot be limited to the traditional field of social measures. We think that the key to many problems is found in the rights and possibilities of the workers to intervene within the enterprises themselves. Permitting real access of workers to information on the economic situation of their enterprise, group, and industry to which it belongs" constitutes a central objective. "As a matter of fact, our contribution as a labor union to the materialization of a real change above all takes place in an autonomous fashion amid our roots in the enterprises, at the ground level, and in the relationships which the workers are capable of establishing between the immediate demands and the prospects of the future"<sup>7</sup>.

What more could business and industry want after they called for a labor unionism centering around the enterprise? The only reservation—and it is a hefty one—has to do with the fact that this labor unionism most of all wants rights and powers in the enterprise. One does not go without the other: The employers will have to pay the price of a more realistic labor unionism.

## And Common Problems

If, out of a lack of awareness, they were to continue their heavy-handed approach, then the labor unions and the employers would run an identical risk: They would progressively lose control over the real problems in the world of labor; they would be incapable of regulating the behavior of the social actors; they would allow the creation of a quasi-anarchic situation in which the two institutions—the employers and the labor unions—would no longer have any credibility.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The risk is all the greater if neither one nor the other in his satchel has a valid response to the problems arising today. We are as a matter of fact witnessing the rise of contradictory aspirations. More numerous constraints rise simultaneously. In other words, there is no longer a chance of finding an overall solution but only of moving toward a permanent settlement of renascent conflicts. Without going into any details, let us report here some of these contradictory pairs whose disappearance we find difficult to visualize. There are contradictions between the demand for free time and the desire for higher wages, between the aspiration for work that is fulfilling and the requirements of productivity and international competition, between a desire for equality and justice and the concern with maintaining differences and asserting one's specificity, between the need for solidarity and the push toward individualized action, between the desire for security and the requirements of flexibility and mobility, between short-time demands and long-term concerns, etc.

One cannot pick either of these alternatives in all cases. There is only one way out: A permanent, ceaselessly revised compromise. But how to bring about a compromise all by oneself, by claiming to be judge and party to the case at the same time? Here of course we must have two partners and both of them will still have to go through the trouble of covering the entire field of diversified aspirations. In isolation, this would be suicide.

## The Requirement for Negotiations

The thrust of new industrial relations will boil down to the extension and permanent institution of negotiations. Until now, there was talk of negotiations only on the highest levels, that is, national or job category. The diversity of problems to be tackled, the need for different solutions will hereafter force us to go down the line on negotiations, all the way to the lowest levels not only the enterprise but perhaps the factory or the workshop. We will have to have national accords and local accords, overall agreements, as well as partial agreements.

We should reserve the word "negotiations" for those episodic meetings which take place to put an end to a conflict. We must now talk of permanent negotiations, we must turn into the normal and habitual practice which alone can bring about acceptable decisions. In that way we are going to have lasting agreements and also provisional agreements.

There is nothing Utopian in these prospects. In a complex society, where one can no longer dream of an idyllic consensus—be it of the Right or of the Left—the only realistic goal is, through negotiation, to work out compromises which are acceptable to the largest number of partners. This realism has been entirely too absent in the labor unions and among the employers to have them fail to measure today the risks of their blindness. Forced to renounce the hope for a total victory but at the same time sure of their survival, they are ready to recognize the existence and power of the other side. May 1981 permits the labor unions to rid themselves of the mortgages of the past, it offers the employers a labor unionism which is more inclined to negotiate and which is closer to the enterprise; it is up to both of them to grasp this chance.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOOTNOTES

1. "Reflexions sur l'avenir du travail" [Reflections on the Future of Labor], la Documentation francaise, 1980.
2. M. Crozier, "La sagesse et le desordre, France 1980" [Wisdom and Disorder in France in 1980], a team effort, NRF, 1980.
3. Idem.
4. J. Moreau, "Employer Policy--New Practices and Old Demons," PROJECT, no 145, May 1980.
5. F. Ceyrac, LE MONDE, 3 July 1981.
6. E. Maire, LE MONDE, 18 August 1979.
7. J. L. Moynot, "What Response to the Crisis Can Change Life?" LE MONDE, 3 July 1981.

COPYRIGHT: CERAS, 15, rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves, 1981

5058

CSO: 3100/983

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

CITIZENS DESIRE RIGHT-WING ACTIVITY; CHIRAC, GISCARD PLAN

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 12 Sep 81 pp 24-25

[Article by Irene Allier: "Where Does the Right Stand?"]

[Text] The UDF [French Democratic Union] is floundering, the RPR grows restless, Chirac is getting ready, Giscard and Barre are observing. The minority is emerging from its lethargy. With what leader? With what strategy?

"It isn't a jump. It isn't an attack. But at last the scales of the wounded beast are beginning to quiver," remarks one who is close to Jacques Chirac. In fact, by announcing on the very day that Parliament reconvened that a motion of censure had been filed against the government, the RPR reminded everyone suddenly, after its long summer sleep, that sooner or later the opposition was going to re-form. In a state of shock ever since France went into a state of grace, the RPR and the UDF, as if by magic, had disappeared from the French political scene. What happened was that the survivors had been glimpsed in July, on the floor [of the National Assembly], where they appeared to be submerged by the Socialist tide.

During the August recess not one of the big names raised his voice. Jacques Chirac remained silent; Giscard, absent; Raymond Barre, inscrutable. Here and there the members of the second rank had proffered a few sententious words with no great import: "With Giscard, France was governed; with Mitterrand, it is drifting" (Michel d'Ornano, UDF). Jacques Toubon (RPR) compared Marseilles with Prague or, to be more explicit, France with the Gulag. As for Jean Lecanuet, he was struggling, with no further results, to find his Social Democrats' rightful place on the new scene. The polls gave the Mitterrand-Mauroy tandem a rating that has never been equaled. Plans for reform fell like bombs at Gravelotte. Change and peaceful force alone occupied the land. The only thing that succeeded in tempering the euphoria of the first days was the counting curves of unemployment and inflation. In short, nothing was heard and little was expected from the opposition side.

The Eyes of Chimene

However, on Tuesday 8 September, the day Parliament reconvened in extraordinary session, a shiver awoke the Assembly. In the morning Philippe Seguin, the RPR deputy from Vosges, and Jacques Toubon, the RPR deputy from Paris, secretly sold their group chairman, Claude Labbe, on the idea of immediately filing a motion to censure against the government. Claude Labbe had this initiative approved by the group's bureau and,

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

in the early afternoon, all the RPR deputies applauded it. Only Jacques Chaban-Delmas was to regret the precipitation that prevented the UDF from being associated with the operation. The matter was carried on regardless. At 1600 Claude Labbe, very proud, took the microphone to announce to the Assembly the first request for censure of his career; the first to emanate from a former-majority group in 23 years. A surprise in truth, it is so difficult to remember constantly that in three months the RPR and the PS have reversed their roles.

What is the goal of this operation, which is destined to misfire, given the new relationship of political forces? First and very obvious, to show that the opposition exists and is going to be encountered. Of course, for the first shot the RPR preferred to turn the spotlights on itself alone and on its leader. But the UDF, which had been informed at the last minute, will support it nonetheless, as the RPR has promised to support the UDF if in the future it should take a similar initiative. In the meantime the RPR scored for 24 hours. Television and newspapers fleetingly found the eyes of Chirac for it.

The second objective was more difficult to attain. It was to sabotage the effect of Mauroy's speech, scheduled for 15 September. On that day the prime minister is to announce a number of measures against unemployment. The RPR, afraid it would have to approve some of them, intended to condemn, before the speech, the government's incompetence in the last three months in the fight against unemployment and inflation, and with the same stroke to rob the anti-unemployment plan of its star billing.

The morning of 9 September, the chairmen's conference disillusioned it: it set the time for the debate on censure for immediately after Mauroy's speech. You might say the debate lost its reason for being at the same time. It now appeared to be nothing more than a simple case based on assumptions rather than facts.

However, it was not without reason that Jacques Chirac and his party decided to emerge from their torpor, even if there were to be no immediate benefit. In reality, the atmosphere in the country has changed perceptibly. And the opposition deputies returning from their provincial districts are becoming pleasantly aware of it. They have sensed what was expressed in numbers in the latest polls: it is not the end of the state of grace (although Mitterrand lost 9 points in 2 months and Mauroy 5, the popularity of the president and the prime minister remains very high), but the end of what Jerome Jaffre called in LE MATIN "unanimism," which surrounded the Socialists after the presidential election of 10 May and made possible the legislative tidal wave in June.

All social classes had been affected by the grace: small farmers, small merchants, highly-placed managerial staffs, retirees and professional people more or less gave their support to the new president. Three months later, at a time when the Socialist government is beginning the promised reforms (nationalizations, tax on wealth, abolishing the death penalty), a group of moderates who have strayed for a moment draw back, terrified, and start looking for a protective wing so they can re-enter the nest. Did they vote for the PS or did they abstain, those who now badgering the elected representatives of the new opposition? "Now what are you doing?" "No one is listening to you!", "Say something! You are not going to let them do it?" Their political constitution is fragile, in any case. No doubt the traditional left, further increased today by the support of the majority of the retirees, clerical workers and middle management, is still largely in the majority. But the right, even though it is a long way from recovering its usual active members, is nonetheless beginning to find its voice again.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The RPR, which is more thoroughly implanted in the country than the UDF and which still has structures--if not elected representatives--at its disposal in all of the departments, was receptive to these early tremors. It is going to be busy adding to them. Just as 44 percent of the French, according to an IFRES [expansion unknown] poll for LA VIE FRANCAISE, consider the new opposition to be "not active enough;" 33 percent think the head of the opposition should stand on the right; and 30 percent put Jacques Chirac at the head of the list as the most plausible leader for that powerful opposition. Ahead of those who are hoping for a new personality (24 percent) and those who cling to the hope that Valery Giscard d'Estaing will fill the role (15 percent).

## A Durable Patience

To tell the truth, the head of the RPR does not need such encouragement to engage in reconquering the government. But, "like pigeons that make big circles around the pigeon house before they find the axis of their flight," he was awaiting the opportunity to come back in. This will probably be on the occasion of a press conference that is envisaged for the end of September, after Francois Mitterrand's press conference.

What strategy did Jacques Chirac grind out during the recess? It is relatively simple, but requires enduring patience. It is based in the first place on the conviction that the Socialist experiment will fail. If you listen to him, he has already announced the failure to the president of the Republic in two hour-long audiences the latter granted to each of the party heads on 25 May, four days after he was installed in the Elysee, and on 14 July, on the eve of his departure for Ottawa. "You will not hold prices, and the purchasing power of the French will diminish. And believe me that counts above everything else with them, above unemployment. I really see it at home in Correze. The Communists will drop you in two years." And Chirac added, reporting these conversations recently to a third party, "The president gave me a dazzling lecture on the PCF; but I replied, purchasing power." Mentioning foreign policy problems in passing, Chirac may also have slipped this "advice" to Mitterrand: "Despite the primary anticommunism I was led into because of Marie-France Garaud, I tell you there is no good alliance with Washington that does not go through Moscow."

Despite what he believes to be an inevitable failure, Jacques Chirac thinks that "Mitterrand will last 7 years." "He has taken the measurements of the General's chair," he said recently. The mayor of Paris is putting his plan of action in place. We will pass over the umpteenth reform of the RPR, which he wants to be both more flexible and more operational at one and the same time. More novel, if not easier to put into operation, is the decision to organize cooperative relations with those of his former UDF partners who might be disposed to do so. A double necessity for one who aims at expanding his political base and recentring his movement. More original is the creation--outside of a kind of Jean Moulin Club, bringing together "the best in their specialties"--physicians, teachers, highly-placed civil servants, bankers, National Administration School graduates, economists--who, though they are "without political membership," had nevertheless offered their cooperation to the mayor of Paris. He expects them to enrich the Chiracian doctrine and eventually furnish managers for his future action.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

## A Fundamental Stake

But Chirac is devoting his early efforts entirely to the next political battle he must wage: the battle of the 1983 municipal elections; for there he can keep--or lose--the Paris mayoralty. For him the stake is a fundamental one. It is from his personal success in Paris and the excellent way in which his movement was run in a test that in 1977 was the forerunner of future victories by the left that Chirac will be able to envisage the 1986 legislative battle, and naturally, the 1988 presidential fight. Chirac is in fact convinced that the Socialists won, less by the conquest of a new electorate than by the collapse of the majority electorate, which largely sought refuge in abstention. He is sure he can reconquer it by means of a new language and new personnel, by listening better to its desiderata, and especially by means of the disappointment certain to be inflicted upon it by the Socialists. In short, the mayor of Paris is back in the saddle and ready to get going again on a long-distance course.

But will he run alone? Nothing is less certain. Giscard is preparing for his political comeback in the silence of his headquarters in the rue Francois I. Raymond Barre has established his observation post in a five-room apartment located in the boulevard Saint-Germain. On his return from Saint-Jean-Cap-Ferrat, where he spent his vacation in his villa, which by coincidence is called "les Dauphins," he is receiving a great deal of mail, to which he replies, "The time will come when all who remain devoted to the fundamental directions of the Fifth Republic will have to get together." Even the senator-mayor of Loudun, Rene Monory, might dream of being a new Pinay, the wise man who must be called upon one day, when all is lost. In Chirac's eyes, however, the latter two are running the risk of playing the role of the eternal recourse in vain. On the other hand, if the former president of the Republic were to re-enter the race, Chirac would be presented with a real inconvenience. Not that he credits him with any chance of success, but to re-form their infernal pair before public opinion might well have a negative effect, to his detriment.

Of course this cannot stop Giscard d'Estaing, who has been ready to begin to win back the government ever since the moment of his defeat. But start again with whom, with what? For three years there was a Giscardian coalition that called itself the UDF and included the little Republican VGE [expansion unknown] Party, the meager troops of Jean Lecanuet's Social Democrats, the remains of the Radical Party and the Prospects and Realities Clubs of Jean-Pierre Fourcade. A heterogeneous coalition, cemented by the support for the conqueror, it took very badly the trauma of defeat. The members of the coalition are scattered in every direction, are victims of a cholera-like feverishness. Without finding them, obviously, they are looking for their atomized troops, their overturned structures, a common doctrine and an opposition's modus operandi.

The structures? "I am in favor of a multiple opposition, and I believe the debate on merging the parties making up the UDF is futile," Jean Lecanuet, the chairman of the UDF but also the leader of the CDS [Social Democratic Center], said in LE POINT. "There has to be one party. From now on we have to envisage a merger under the same or some other insignia," Jean-Francois Deniau, the manager of Giscard's presidential campaign, retorts in LE MONDE.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Rough Battles

Their place in the opposition? "We are not employing the policy of painting things as black as possible. We are neither the restoration party nor the party of the emigres from inside," proclaims Lecanuet. "We are situating ourselves on the border of the majority in order to fight it." Bernard Stasi, chairman-delegate of the CDS, qualifies the words by bringing up Gaston Defferre's regionalization plan, which he suggests approving. "When it was a partner in carrying on the government, the CDS continually fought for decentralization...We will remain faithful to that fight, despite the change of sides," he writes. But in La Canourgue (Lozere), where the Republican Party has just opened its summer university, Secretary General Jacques Blanc roars, "We are an opposition party, in implacable opposition...because the solutions that have been proposed can only bring disaster with them."

The same is true of doctrine. Jean-Pierre Fourcade is the only one who dares declare aloud, "We are loyal to the theses and values defended by Giscard d'Estaing in "French Democracy." Quite obviously, reference to the "Book" is no longer a winner among his friends and partners. To complete the misfortune, the UDF is rent by the quarrels of men. Rough battles are going on in the wings between Michel Pinton, the UDF delegate at large, and Roger Chinaud, whose defeat in the legislative elections in the Paris 18th district, deprived him of his post of group chairman, and who is conducting the offensive so he can take his place.

An underhanded struggle within the CDS is pitting two of Giscard's former ministers against each other: Jacques Barrot (Health) and Pierre Mehaignerie (Agriculture). It involves the succession to Lecanuet, of course, but it also involves longer-term strategy. "The former would not be hostile to rapprochement with the Socialists at a later date, while the other has his eye on Giscard," one of their mutual friends asserts. While in La Canourgue Jacques Blanc, undaunted, proclaims urbi et orbi, "There is no room for personal ambitions, only for a common ambition!"

The right, having thus come back onto the stage in this autumn reconvening, is decidedly presenting a most curious spectacle: two champion cyclists confront each other on the track. Having been observed marking time for a long while, the first one starts up like a whirlwind--while the second one seems to be occupied still in assembling his wheels, his handlebars, his saddle and his pedals.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"

8946  
CSO: 3100/995

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

CGT LEADERSHIP CHANGE: SEGUY'S HEALTH OR PCF STALINISTS

Paris LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR in French 12 Sep 81 p 26

[Article by Claude-Francois Jullien: "The CGT: Taking Over From the 'Hardliners'"]

[Text] Krasucki is going to replace Seguy. But it is more than just a change of men.

Post-Seguy has already begun in the CGT. For a long time Henri Krasucki, the Number Two man in the Confederation, appeared to be the strong man of the big French labor union group. The fact that for the first time, on Tuesday 8 September, the keynote speech at the CGT opening session confirms the change. Georges Seguy should announce his approaching departure to the national confederal committee in October. The transfer of power should take place at the June 1982 congress, if the statutes are to be observed. But the fact is, the power has already changed hands.

Officially, Georges Seguy, who is ill, no longer has the strength to direct the group. No one can deny the fatigue that marks this 54-year-old fighter. A member of the Resistance and of the PCF, at 17 he was deported to Mauthausen. For 15 months he endured camp life. Back in France, he waged a dual head-on engagement, political and union. Elected in 1956 a member of the politburo of the PCF, he went to the confederal bureau of the CGT in 1965, and two years later replaced Benoit Frachon as general secretary. Since then he has never stopped working.

However, these reasons of health are not totally convincing. Recently, some of his friends went farther: "You'll see, he agrees to pretend to leave, but he will be re-elected at the congress." Today they are not saying the same thing: "For several years people have organized completely false leaks on the state of Seguy's health. We were wrong in treating the operation with scorn."

Devoted People

"Georges Seguy," they are saying, "has always refused to sacrifice the CGT for the PCF; but he was also incapable of conducting a rebellion." This ambiguous position led the general secretary to wage battles discreetly, sometimes to win them, but to lose the war. In favor of unity of action and a leftist victory in 1978, he no doubt appreciated the unilateral "assessment" of the "Common Program" by the PCF in May 1977, that first stabbing of the Union of the Left. Moreover, he supported Jean-Louis Moynot, who dared to initiate criticism, adding however, "It is premature."

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

In November 1978 he was the architect of the 40th Congress, the "openness" congress, which recognized--with respect to the PCF in particular--the CGT's diversity. In December 1979 he was in the minority in the politburo because he desired a condemnation of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Finally, even though today he is preparing for the coming congress of the World Trade Union Federation in Havana, his quarrels with that crypto-Soviet organization are famous. Even though he always ended up by aligning himself with the PCF, he was no longer a man they could count on.

But now the PCF needs, at the head of the CGT and in the apparatus, men who are absolutely devoted. Communists are sitting in the government and the party can no longer so easily make itself the spokesman for all the discontented. The CGT, which it controls, must take over in its behalf and assert itself as the spearhead of the working class. This being the case, it can no longer be motivated by the partisans of unity of action, but must be run and controlled by trustworthy men who are devoted to the party.

This taking in hand again, even though it worries the minister of Labor, does not mean that the CGT is going to throw itself into systematic criticism of the government. On the contrary, at first it may favor continuing the state of grace; and that was the direction of Krasucki's speech on 8 September. It will be necessary to wait until the PCF decides to stand aloof, before the well-oiled union machine, kept under pressure, can be turned on.

Henri Krasucki is the ideal man for this takeover. Behind the falsely candid smile he always wears is a redoubtable leader. A "Stal," his detractors say. Little by little he has seized control of the key sectors of the Confederation, especially the press and the federations. In addition, his promotion is going to reassure the Communist militants who were shocked by the PCF-PS collaboration. Was he not, they say, with Georges Gosnat, the only one of the party leadership to vote against having Communists in the government? A reference. And his friend Michel Warcholak, a member of the Central Committee of the PCF and the confederal bureau of the CGT, is he not asserting that the famous 40 Congress--the "openness" congress--is an "impromptu" event--in other words, an episode--in the history of the Confederation?

The departure of Georges Seguy and the arrival of "Krasu" announce other changes. The confederal bureau has 16 members: eight communists and eight noncommunists. Rene Buhl and Jacqueline Lambert--two of the noncommunists--left the bureau in January 1981, and only Alphonse Veronese was elected in their place. The departure of Pierre Gensous (PCF), Andre Alamy (PCF) and perhaps Livio Mascarello has been announced. But there is also a rumor going around that the new general secretary wants a tumbrel.

### Three Names

The first victims would be two communists, Jean-Louis Moynot and Christiane Gilles. In spite of pressure, they had the audacity to refuse to vote for Georges Marchais in the first round of the presidential election. Intolerable! Also dismissed is Ernest Deiss, a "New Life" Catholic who, in an interview in "TEMOIGNAGE CHRETIEN" defended the necessary union independence. Finally liquidated is the whirlwind, Jean-Claude Laroze, who has been less useful to the CGT communists since he quit the PS. So the congress should elect at least seven new members out of 16 in the confederal bureau.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Among the new appointments, three of the names being mentioned are significant: Gerard Alezard, the secretary of the Paris Departmental Union and member of the Central Committee; Therese Hirsberg, general secretary of the Civil Servants' Federation and member of the Central Committee; Raymond Barberis, a faithful follower of "Krasu." "It is the return of the Stalinists!" says a protester, who adds, "It's also worrisome for the claimed growth of the PCF!" In any case, the CGT leadership has permanently buried the 40th Congress.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 "le Nouvel Observateur"

8946  
CSO: 3100/992

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

NEW GOVERNMENT: TRANSITION, ERRORS, SUCCESSES, FUTURE PROBLEMS

Paris PROJET in French Sep-Oct 81 pp 911-914

[Article by Hugues Portelli: "Uninterrupted Transition"]

[Text] It is always difficult to evaluate the first steps of a new government. Nor do the French socialists escape this rule. While action undertaken in the past few months responds to a single line of logic: implementation of the presidential program, serious contradictions are emerging despite the government's denials.

The gradual takeover by the new majority furnishes a prime example: There are two opposing logics: the one inherited from the traditional internal life of the Socialist Party and the equally traditional one of the Fifth Republic. At the time of the formation of the government and its subsequent shakeup, have we not seen the prime minister, following the example of the Italian Christian Democrats, dole out the various posts based on the weight of the different party factions, with leaders receiving ministerial rank? When ministry staffs were set up, the holder of the portfolio was careful, in most cases, to surround himself with advisers and supporters who had already followed him in the party, without always being concerned about their actual competence. Likewise, in the National Assembly, the distribution of responsibilities in the various committees did not escape the logic of the factions and the president of the socialist group had to demonstrate consummate skill in order not to be overwhelmed by factional quarrels.

If, despite these trying precedents, the new government has not succumbed more to factional divisiveness, it is because the president of the republic rapidly imposed his authority. Inopportune moves on the part of a given minister have been immediately rectified and condemned and ministerial rivalries have remained secondary. The prime minister and the first secretary of the Socialist Party as well -- which says a great deal about Francois Mitterrand's determination to retain control over the majority party -- have rapidly become accustomed to the Elysee's power and have noted that nothing was changed in the institutional balance. To be convinced of this, one has but to consider the operation of the Council of Ministers or to read the president's message to the Parliament preceding Pierre Mauroy's address when he presented his program.

Majorities change, but the spirit of institutions remains, for better or worse. Thus, the new government has effected a systematic sweep of the audiovisual field and decided upon a prefectoral movement of exceptional scope. On the other hand,

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

certain key sectors such as the courts and the army have remained untouched by any purges. At the same time, and despite the speeches about restoring a balance between the Executive and Legislative branches, the first act of the president was to put his stalwarts in the key posts of president of the Assembly and president of the parliamentary group. At the special session, the latter maneuvered with perfect monolithism, reminiscent of the UDR [Union of Democrats for the Republic], although one can justifiably think that it will not always be the case.

As for the proclaimed rights of the new opposition, the first skirmishes on the regulation of the National Assembly show that the liberalism of its president will be completely relative. It is true that the opposition, as yet poorly accustomed to its new status, is inclined to a systematically prejudiced attitude toward the new government. Even the Senate does not seem to escape the rule and the temptation to act as an opposition chamber was apparent from the very first votes.

Despite the fact that the majority in the Assembly and the president are of the same persuasion, the position of the prime minister is perhaps the most delicate. Pierre Mauroy risks difficulty in overcoming a major political contradiction: As a leader belonging to the moderate wing of the party, his plan is to give the government's policy the stamp of real reformism but based on healthy management. His agreement with the minister of finance on this point is obvious.

But this relative moderation may be contradicted by his determination to bring about the most decisive structural reforms from the very beginning of the 7-year term: nationalizations, decentralization, a reduction in inequalities. Mauroy must in fact resolve the problem of all the first prime ministers of all 7-year terms: not displeasing or giving umbrage to the president, while creating an image of himself that will keep him in favor with the republic. Jacques Chaban-Delmas failed. If Mauroy wants to succeed, he must leave the memory of a man of great reforms, but also of good administration. This double objective is perhaps contradictory insofar as the prime minister is far from having all the trump cards. Does he not continually risk being overcome by the one-upmanship of his allies or even his friends? How can one be the head of the parliamentary majority when one belongs to a minority faction of one's own party and of the socialist group in the Assembly? How can one counterbalance these real risks other than by relying on the person of which the prime minister tends to be only the instrument: the president of the republic?

Concerned about his image, Mauroy therefore went about launching the grand reforms promised as early as June. In each case, whatever has been said, the caution has been real. With respect to the reduction in the work week, the determination has led to limited progress because of resistance on the part of management. Concerning nationalizations, the targeted enterprises are companies resigned to a public takeover, which was already the case for some of them. Regarding decentralization, the opposition between the supporters of a communal government, departmentalists, regionalists and revolutionaries within the Socialist Party itself has led to an initial spreading out of reform. The real problem mainly involves the lack of drafting of bills. The determination to work as rapidly as possible has often led to the presentation of bills that had visibly not been sufficiently thought out: shaky drafting, contradictions, as in the bill on decentralization. The presence in the Assembly of a majority of inexperienced deputies would not indicate that these imperfections will immediately be corrected.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

It may be objected that these are inevitable flaws in a political force that for 25 years has been kept out of the administration of affairs and the knowledge of dossiers. Consequently, between the immobility of a general moratorium and the risks of groping its way around, the government has chosen the second solution, for the "state of grace" is not eternal and, as the English and German examples demonstrate, reforms that are not made at the beginning of the legislative period will not be made subsequently. The French socialists can count on the element of time, but this element will essentially serve long-term reforms (work week, taxes), if not to "digest" structural reforms. Is this not the first time that the right will not have to apply, as after the Popular Front or the Liberation, the reforms promised by the left?

For the time being, the new government seems to have succeeded in reassuring its supporters, whether old or new, by imposing a new style in relations with the country: democratization of the status of immigrants, breaking with the previous latent racism; abolition of the "security and freedom" law and especially, of the underlying police ideology; and affirmation of the equality of all before the law, including unscrupulous businessmen (Willot case) or the parallel police (SAC [Civic Action Service]). It also reassures those -- mainly abroad -- who had some question about the solidity of France's international commitments: the very "Western" attitude of President Mitterrand on the matter of the Euromissiles (clearer than that of the Socialist Party previous to June 1981) is a good example.

But one can never reassure anyone but those who truly want to be reassured. As the "state of grace" is gradually diminished in the face of the realities of the economic crisis, unemployment and international tension, it will no longer be enough to reassure. The right, disabled, will for a long time be disorganized and without any alternative. The first shots may therefore come from a Communist Party shaken by its decline and whose support for Francois Mitterrand is far from enthusiastic, as the veiled criticisms of L'HUMANITE and the open reticence of the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] amply show.

It is a curious period of transition when one makes a spectacular break with certain aspects of the previous policies, but when one tacitly packs up more than one orientation, when the determination to bring reform carefully skirts the traditional "leftist" lobbies, and when yesterday's ideologists fall silent in order to learn to govern.

COPYRIGHT: CERAS, 15 rue R.-Marcheron, 92170 Vanves, 1981

11,464  
CSO: 3100/984

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

FRANCE

PS-PC CONFLICTS: NUCLEAR, MILITARY, IMMIGRANTS

Paris PARIS MATCH in French 28 Aug 81 pp 32, 33

[Article by Arthur Conte]

[Text] Clearly, rifts run deeply across the whole Socialist/Communist front.

Officially, of course, the Socialist and Communist ministers continue to get along well with the administration. With the help of the vacation mood, which does not encourage dramatization, the two majority parties are avoiding any outburst among them which could cause a scandal. Fiterman, whose virulence the Socialists had to suffer for so long, has become all honey. Marchais is not there. Mauroy is managing to evade any declaration which would stir up the slightest dispute among comrades. The four Communist ministers are competing to see who will be the most discreet, like shadows in the corridors of power.

But, in actuality, things are far from well set.

At least six serious disagreements may invite open government crises at any moment.

The first involves nuclear power in France. The Communist party has never hidden the fact that it is an avid supporter of nuclear power, "the only thing capable," Marchais has even announced, "of assuring the complete independence of our people both in the short and long run." Clearly, this position has not and will not be changed. It is a basic principle. If Francois Mitterrand is still able to nurture any illusions on the subject, the CGT [General Confederation of Labor] certainly would not be the ones to leave him any: its militants reacted to the closing of the nuclear work sites now in progress with a violence and a speed which says much for the will of the labor confederation and of the party, its brother, never to compromise in this area. Now, the Socialist Party is far from demonstrating as firm a conviction. Whether anxious not to overly alienate its ecology-minded supporters, or powerfully undermined by serious internal disputes or by natural incapacity to take responsibility without wavering, for weeks now it has been showing an impressive indecision. The President of the Republic himself has let his discontent be known. In the end, the Socialist ministers were able to make contradicting statements among or with each other, over a period of a few days, on this problem which is so vital to the country's future.

## FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

And, today, no one at all, not even Mitterrand himself, could tell us what position the Socialists will end up supporting. Depending on the choice finally made, or if indecision such as this persists for several months, obviously there will be many opportunities for the Socialists and the Communists to cross swords, even at the highest levels of power.

Edmond Maire, One of the Leaders of the Socialist Venture

The second disagreement involves everything which is happening in our southern departments. During the last electoral campaigns, and even for some 20 years, the Socialists promised miracle upon miracle there to our vine and fruit growers. According to them, the whole problem was due to the stupidity of or to the position taken by the Gaullist or the Giscard administrations. On the other hand, in a few days, "you will see what you will see," they would return full prosperity to the vine growers and the truck farmers. They delivered their wonderful promises with enormous imprudence, because they themselves know only too well that no one has the magic wand which can instantly settle such a difficult problem. Whatever may be the case, such is the chief political result: the Socialists are on trial for not having known how to keep the least of too many wild promises. Apparently, the embarrassment of all the Socialist deputies in an area where they had massive wins in June on the faith of a simple sermon is being surmised. But, it happens that the Communists, far from showing them the slightest sympathy or commiseration, are not the last when it comes to organizing demonstrations "against the incompetence of the government." Most of the time even, whether through their important elected officials in the region, or through the crypto-communist organization Modef, it is the Communists who take the initiative in the struggle and claim the most spectacular responsibilities. Obviously, in an area which is such a valuable Socialist stronghold, this cannot go on without serious consequences--nor without heated reckoning among the two parties.

Edmond Maire is integral to the third dispute. It is known that, in point of fact, as of 1971 the Socialist Party began to prosper only because it opened its doors wide to the Christian unionists. This was its true renewal so much so that it can be said in general that the new Socialist Party, even more so than Francois Mitterrand's party, is Edmond Maire's. "Sacristy Socialists," grumbled Guy Mollet, "they have plunged me into holy water." As exaggerated as it was, the remark had some basic truth to it. The May/June electoral campaigns only showed even more clearly the immense share of the socialist vote that the leftist Christians have taken: to get a better picture we only have to study closely the formidable results that the new Socialists obtained in the most traditionally Catholic provinces, in Brittany and even in Alsace, for example. Furthermore: it has escaped no one that the major measures taken by Francois Mitterrand since his election in the social, economic and fiscal area have been basically of Christian progressive inspiration. And better still: several days ago, after a luncheon meeting with Pierre Mauroy, Edmond Maire could be seen and heard expressing himself as an expert, or at least as a very high level official, on all the hottest political issues of the day: state Cour de Surete, decentralization. This was not just an important union leader speaking, but one who spoke as a real adviser, as if with direct responsibilities of state. Whatever the case may be, it is quite true that Edmond Maire has become one of the great leaders of the venture, if not its chief

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

inspiration. But, as a matter of fact, Edmond Maire's enormous importance, which he does not think of trying to hide, is no small problem for Georges Seguy or Georges Marchais. If there were any untimely intervention which could make them grit their teeth, this is it. The challenge is simple to accept. War among the union groups will precede indeed will precipitate war among the allied Socialists and Communists.

The Socialists are Surprised by Their Own Audacity

Although perhaps the least apparent, the fourth disagreement brewing is not the least serious. It has to do with nationalizations. You do not have to be a genius to recognize that in this matter the Socialists have improvised the affair incredibly. Everything occurred and was prepared for as if the Socialists, when they planned their nationalizations, did not realize at all exactly what was involved. In any case, now they are surprised by their own boldness, that is if they have already recovered from their ignorance.

This is the origin, on their part, of a certain caution, a certain circumspection and, above all, a certain fear of destroying or paralyzing "nationalizable" enterprises which are operating well.

On the other hand, the Communist's extremism on the subject is categorical. They never cease presenting demand upon demand. As far as they are concerned, the Socialist administration never goes far enough or fast enough. Obviously, sooner or later, this will lead to open conflict. As long as the Socialists play the extremist game and agree as much as possible with the Communists, the Communists will grudgingly effect partial satisfaction. But when, through realism and wisdom, the Socialists, who are directly and fully responsible for our financial condition, want to slow down or suspend the nationalization movement, the most fervent protests may be expected from Georges Marchais and his party.

The fifth disagreement: immigrants. Many of us would be astonished were we to learn that the Communist Party is passionately in favor of allowing immigrants to vote in the next municipal elections. They would truly have had to make a terrific effort. The militants and the Communist electorate would be even more resistant to such a proposal than the bourgeois and nationalist population who are not in direct contact with colonies of immigrants. On the other hand, the Communist Party guards the "national" character of its program at any price. It does not want to be suspected in any way of diminishing the national character or the national responsibility. Communist party leadership would even tremble with horror at hearing such a project, moreover announced by Claude Cheysson one of the ministers who is least accepted by the Seraglio faith. In return, here is an "internationalist" or "world" project which cannot help but please the supporters of universal socialism and particularly the theoreticians of Christian socialism. Even if many Socialist mayors and county councilmen must present themselves as more than hesitant in such an area, it is obvious that the Edmond Maire's, the Bouchardeau's, the Krivine's and the Ceresien's must warmly applaud such a dream. A new opportunity for misunderstanding and conflict. Whatever the case, the opposition of the Communist party has had to be a determining factor in the Socialist party's renunciation of their attempt to have the new regulation apply as of 1983.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The Communists Practice a Cautious Reserve

And the sixth deep-seated disagreement: military policy. It was a tactical masterpiece when, on 22 June, in order to erase their basic differences of opinion on military strategy, the two parties requested "rapid occurrence of international negotiations on reduction and limitation of arms in Europe." In the art of eliminating the irreconcilable, there was nothing better. Marchais and Mitterrand executed a lofty virtuoso performance. Everything took place as if the "warring brothers" now had every reason to come to terms; even to find "impossible agreement." The fact remains that, underneath, the opposition between them is as strong as ever. We will never hear the Communists condemn the placement of Soviet SS 20 nuclear missiles on European soil, an implantation which Mitterrand and his friends have deplored time and again. Neither will we hear them approve the American plan for placement of Pershing missiles, a program with which Mitterrand expressed satisfaction during the first days of his term. Since 1978 the Soviet Union and, immediately after, the French Communist Party, have condemned the production of the neutron bomb; Georges Marchais even denounced this "N" bomb as aggressive and non-defensive. Along with all the other Communists throughout the world, he goes so far as to declare it "a determining factor for the next world war."

Francois Mitterrand is far from expressing such a decisive opinion: in any case, as far as is known, he has not decided to halt studies and experiments in progress on this weapon which clearly is the ideal tactical weapon, perfectly suited to halt a possible massive attack on Western Europe by Soviet armored divisions. There are extraordinarily serious differences of opinion which cannot be concealed for long.

To these six sources of disagreement we can even add two more, both also visible.

On the one hand, although Marchais and Mitterrand use the same words in deploring the Soviet army's intervention in Afghanistan, the tone is far from identical. Clearly, the two men in speaking the same sentence do not give it the same meaning.

On the other hand, we cannot help but notice that the Communists have become quite detached regarding the administration's financial policy. Not only have they been careful not to claim or accept direct responsibility, but, they are attentively preparing for the time when they will have to divorce themselves of any responsibility for failure, if failure should occur. Of course, they are heard now and again in support of such and such a particular initiative, but, overall, they are maintaining a careful distance. And, be sure of this: the Communists will not be the least severe of critics should failure become evident.

On the whole, then, the present and the outlook for Socialist/Communist relations are much less "rosy" than the administration propaganda allows.

For all that, is it possible that they will erupt in the form of a serious crisis this fall?

That would be saying a lot, even if anything has become possible in this crazy whirlwind world, which no longer spares France either.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

The state of grace may still last a few seasons: the Communists have too much to gain from it to lightly allow a definitive split.

Let us say that they must view it in three ways.

One, they foresee financial disaster due to exorbitant interest rates, after many months. In this case it is completely in their interest to remain on the Ship of State. They will remain there whatever the cost. Then, they will be the most diligent in "erasing" the most serious disagreements.

Marchais Will Eclipse All Opponents in Severity

Second, they envisage the possibility of rapid disaster. In this case, they will be the first to make known their "longtime disagreements." Marchais will eclipse all other opponents in severity.

Or third, serious aggravation of the international situation will occur: for example, due to the Polish crisis. It would be very surprising then if the two parties could, for more than a few days, express an absolutely identical policy. In order to split, the Communist Party would have to list the full catalogue of grievances. Another reason to keep them fueled and not to do anything to completely neutralize them. In any case, as far as common sense goes, the evidence is there: serious rifts are visible between the Communists and the Socialists and it would not be surprising to see them eventually cause a large problem.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 par Cogedipresse S.A.

9693

CSO: 3100/956

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

POLITICAL

ITALY

PCI'S COLAJANNI INTERVIEWED ON INTRAPARTY WRANGLES

PM280845 Milan EUROPEO in Italian 21 Sep 81 pp 12-14

[Interview with PCI Senate deputy floor leader Napoleone Colajanni by Claudio Rinaldi: "Come on Comrades, Let Us Argue"]

[Excerpts] [Question] Senator, why is the PCI so divided at present?

[Answer] Divided is not the right word.

[Question] What do you consider the right word?

[Answer] It is experiencing an extremely major debate: this is true. But that should cause no surprise.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] For at least three good reasons.

[Question] Would you care to list them?

[Answer] First, if there is one thing on which all the analyses that have recently emerged within the party agree, it is the crisis of the Italian political system. It is absurd to believe that the PCI can fail to be affected by this crisis. At the very least, it poses new problems.

[Question] What else?

[Answer] Second, the notion of socialism is now less clearly defined than it once was. This applies to the PCI, but it also applies to all components of the international workers and socialist movement.

[Question] What is the third reason?

[Answer] It is what [PCI directorate member] Pietro Ingrao calls the emergence of new subject--perhaps an insufficiently clear expression. The party's relations with the masses cannot fail to change. For instance, at one time it was based on the transmission belt; now the need for autonomous mass bodies is a real one....

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] In other words, the communist unease stems from fundamental causes, not only immediate political ones. Is that the case?

[Answer] Yes.

[Question] Why do you hesitate to talk in terms of a division and prefer to say that there is a debate?

[Answer] Because the word "division" implies a continuous counterposition among organized currents.

'Not Enough Discussion'

[Question] Is it not perhaps true that there are the Berlinguer supporters, the Ingrao supporters, the Amendola supporters and so forth?

[Answer] No, there are no currents in the PCI. From time to time there is a comparison of stances--even different ones--in which agreements and disagreements are freely expressed (or should be expressed) independently of preestablished patterns. And a dialogue is a sign of vitality. I might disagree with Ingrao on several points but if Ingrao says something that I consider correct why should I not say so?

[Question] In my opinion this is only the start. It seems to me that not all the problems have yet been properly identified.

[Question] Why?

[Answer] Hitherto there has been much debate within the PCI on a policy line, namely whether or not we should aim at unity with the socialists. Or on a broader formula, such as the democratic alternative. Well, I believe that we should not stop there.

[Question] It is not a matter of establishing whether [PSI secretary] Bettino Craxi is good or bad.

[Answer] Precisely.

[Question] What else must be discussed?

[Answer] Many things. Let us take the issue of the state and the institutions. Here the time is ripe for reforms and we are faced with difficult questions. Take the following one, for instance: How can one reconcile the just demand for local authorities with the demand for a democratic central government that will work?

[Question] What else?

[Answer] Then there is the economy. Here, too, there are many problems to be resolved. Do people realize or not that the social subjects' autonomy always

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

has a negative, corporative, aspect and that it is not easy to surmount corporativism in a society in which the individual subjects' demands are mostly legitimate but improving one subject's situation means worsening another's?

[Question] If I understand you correctly, you are saying that in the PCI today there is too little, not too much, discussion?

[Answer] I am saying that there is an insuppressible need for discussion and in-depth study and that if the problems which I mentioned are discussed different stances are inevitable. I am also saying that these problems must now be broached.

[Question] The debate within the PCI still seems to be limited, as you say. Moreover, it seems difficult to interpret, camouflaged behind innumerable verbal reserves. Why, if [PCI secretariat member] Napolitano disagrees with Berlinguer, is he forced to say so indirectly, after endless preambles explaining that there are no personal counterpositions? Why can only major leaders of long standing--at one time Giorgio Amendola, now [PCI directorate member] Pajetta--call a spade a spade?

[Answer] The sense of the value of party unity is an inalienable characteristic of PCI members. It is a legacy of the Third International which gives the party great strength and must be safeguarded. A particular approach, which might even seem hypocritical from outside, is dictated by the acknowledgement of the need for unity which spontaneously permeates the party. This need, I repeat, must be safeguarded, but it must be adapted to the present situation; it must not prevent the freest expression of different opinions. Unity can no longer be assessed in the same way as it once was. Now it can only result from a convincing debate--that is, one based on analysis and arguments, not on formulas.

[Question] Is the debate within the PCI still based too much on slogans?

[Answer] I am thinking about the historical compromise: in the correct definition of it given several times by Berlinguer it is not a government alliance but a relationship among various classes and parties to achieve shared objectives. Nevertheless, it has become a slogan. I am thinking about the difference between the democratic alternative and the leftwing alternative, full of subtleties and difficult to understand. A clear and explicit discussion of the substance of things is indispensable for the proper training of communist cadres.

[Question] Is this a problem too?

[Answer] In the DC the training of cadres takes place through the struggle among the currents. In our party it has taken place in the past through a very tough selection process imposed from outside circumstances--clandestinity, the armed struggle against fascism and the major social struggles of the fifties. Now the situation has changed. Now cadres can be selected only on the basis of their ability to lead by winning over people's opinions and through the explicit--not formal--expression of support. Unless selection takes place by very rigorous democratic methods, bureaucracy and conformism become a real danger.

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

[Question] In recent weeks the PCI seems to have adopted the method of secret ballots.

[Answer] I find nothing strange in that. It can be done. But it is a matter of form rather than substance.

[Question] I would not be so sure about that. The secret ballot is a guarantee against the imposition of options from above.

[Answer] Yes, but the recourse to the secret ballot does not in itself guarantee that there will be a free, responsible and thorough debate, as there should be.

[Question] But a party cannot live on debate alone. There must be decisions too. And the PCI seems to be in a state of crisis in this connection too.

[Answer] If there is little discussion it is inevitable that little will be decided or that only individual comrades' stances will emerge. What I mean by discussion is something conclusive, not a continuous performance [happening]. Our party is not a debating society: it needs to take decisions all the time. But this does not mean that decisions must always be reached by a majority. There is also the synthesis which transcends individual positions, thus achieving the reconciliation essential to party unity.

[Question] Who carries out this reconciliation?

[Answer] Togliatti's great strength was that he carried out the synthesis. But a Togliatti is born only once a century. Even if another one emerged he could not behave as before. Now synthesis must be entrusted to the democratic method of open debate.

[Question] The most acute conflict at present is between Berlinguer and Napolitano, who criticizes the secretary for two main reasons: the tendency to class the PSI and the DC together, thus abandoning the necessary distinctions, and the danger of adopting purely condemnatory stances.

[Answer] I would point out first that it is a mistake to portray the PCI's internal situation as dominated by a personal dispute between Berlinguer and Napolitano.

[Question] You say that Napolitano is entitled to express criticisms without these being mistaken for bids to oust Berlinguer. Agreed. But is it or is it not possible to discuss the hypothesis of changing secretary in the PCI? Many people, starting with the socialists, consider it absurd that the PCI's new policy, namely the alternative, is being pursued by the same Berlinguer who refused it for so many years for the sake of the compromise.

[Answer] Part of the legacy of the Third International is the notion that a change of secretary is a traumatic event. In my opinion there is nothing traumatic about it, and this is one of the points that must be resolved--but resolved on the time

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

scale and in the ways required when there are hundreds of thousands of party members who reflect a very rich and complex historical and human phenomenon in their outlook and their genuine morality and enthusiasm. You cannot do things simply to satisfy the demands of the first [PSI deputy secretary] Martelli who passes by. With regard to the facts of the matter, moreover, I cannot understand why every policy change must inevitably involve a change of secretary. If the formulation of the policy line must not fall solely on the secretary's shoulders, still less should there be any crude and automatic connection between policy changes and the replacement of secretaries.

COPYRIGHT: 1981 Rizzoli Editore

CSO: 3104/2

END

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY